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A Review of the Evidence and Its 





Despite the promise of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
of 1990, eight years of uninterrupted economic growth, and a series of
government initiatives to integrate those with disabilities into the
workforce, survey data tell us that the employment rates of working-
aged men and women with disabilities declined substantially during
the 1990s business cycle. In fact, the employment rate of working-aged
people with disabilities was lower in 2000, the peak year of the 1990s
business cycle, than at the bottom year of that business cycle (1992).
At the same time, employment rates of those without disabilities grew.
Concomitant with their fall in employment was a decline in their labor
earnings, which were primarily offset by an increasing dependence on
federal government income support benefits, namely, Social Security
Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI).
Labor earnings of those without disabilities grew markedly at the same
time. This disconnect between the employment fortunes of those with
disabilities and the rest of the population is in stark contrast to the
1980s business cycle, when the employment and earnings of those with
and without disabilities moved in the same direction. What explains
this change in employment trends in the 1990s? Did people with dis-
abilities face greater discrimination in the workplace, despite or per-
haps because of the ADA? Did workers with disabilities respond to the
easing of disability eligibility standards and the increase in relative
SSDI and SSI benefits and, forced to make an all or nothing choice,
chose to leave the labor force and enter these programs at a greater
rate? Or did the medical conditions and functional limitations among
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those with disabilities become more severe, making work less of an
option for a growing number of them? 
The previous chapters attempt to answer four sets of questions
regarding the measured change in the employment rates of working-
aged people with disabilities in the 1990s. The first two sets of ques-
tions focus on measurement issues: 
• Did employment rates fall, or is this conclusion simply an artifact
of flawed data? 
• What population should be used to capture the employment
trends of working-aged people with disabilities and evaluate the
success of public policies aimed at this population? Should we
measure employment for the full spectrum of people with disabil-
ities, only those with disabilities who say they can work, or only
those with disabilities who are targeted by the ADA?
The third set of questions focuses on causality: 
• What caused these measured declines in the employment rate of
working-aged people with disabilities in the 1990s: changes in
the basic characteristics of the population with disabilities (sex,
age, race, and education); changes in the nature of work that
make it more difficult for people with disabilities to compete with
others; the growing cost of health care and how it is financed;
increases in the average severity of health conditions and impair-
ments of those who have disabilities; unintended consequences of
the ADA, which discouraged employers from hiring and, hence,
increased discrimination against working-aged people with dis-
abilities; or lowering of eligibility standards for the SSDI and SSI
programs, as well as an increase in the relative value of SSDI
benefits for low-wage workers, that encouraged a movement out
of the labor force and onto the income support rolls?
The final set of questions focuses on what must be done in the light of
this evidence: 
• As we move into a new century and a new business cycle, what
are the implications for public policy of the employment experi-
ences of working-aged people with disabilities documented dur-
ing the past two decades? Should we focus on inducing
employers to employ those with disabilities rather than compel-
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ling them to do so via regulation? Should we shift from a predom-
inately insurance-based disability support system to one that is
more work oriented? 
In what follows, we present our own answers to each of these ques-
tions, drawing on the evidence presented in the earlier chapters.
Although we agree with many of the conclusions reached by the
authors of individual chapters, we do not agree with them all. Indeed,
we cannot agree with them all because some key conclusions are in
direct conflict with one another.
Objective interpretation of the evidence provided in this book is
difficult because of the emotionally charged nature of some of the
issues it raises. On the one hand, those who believe that the social envi-
ronment is the primary factor in determining the employment of work-
ing-aged people with disabilities are uncomfortable believing that the
primary reason for the decline in employment in the 1990s was an
increase in the severity of the health conditions and functional limita-
tions of this population. Appeals to a medical model of this sort are dif-
ficult to accept for those who advocate for the full integration of people
with disabilities into the workforce. This is particularly the case when
much of the evidence for this view relies on the belief that the response
of people with work limitations to a question asking whether they are
able to work at all is solely influenced by the severity of their condi-
tion, and not by the social environment in which they find themselves.
 On the other hand, those who see the ADA as the primary mecha-
nism to more fully integrate people with disabilities into the workforce
may fear that evidence to the contrary will lead to abandonment of the
rights of this population rather than modifications of the law and its
enforcement to more effectively achieve this goal.
Likewise, supporters of SSDI or SSI as mechanisms for providing
insurance against lost earnings owing to a disability, or as a guarantee
of minimum income support for all Americans with disabilities, might
fear the political consequences of evidence showing how expansion of
these programs resulted in the decline in the employment of working-
aged people with disabilities. Such political consequences might
include reforms that will increase the vulnerability of the population
with disabilities in the name of improving their employment.
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Finally, those who believe that market-based solutions are ulti-
mately the most appropriate way to allocate resources are less than
happy with evidence showing the inability of private labor markets to
employ all those who are willing and able to work, at a living wage,
and including health insurance benefits.
In other words, objective evidence is always controversial to those
unwilling to allow their policy hopes to be tempered by reality. When
public policy is subject to the scrutiny of social science, the outcome of
that research is, by its nature, uncertain. Yet, an unflinchingly objective
examination of the evidence is critical if we are to learn from the past
and improve the employment opportunities of working-aged people
with disabilities while maintaining appropriate income protection for
those unable to work. 
More controversial than the empirical evidence in this book, how-
ever, is the policy changes that it implies. Ultimately, policymakers
must make the trade-off between the goal of increased employment
and the increased economic independence that employment brings to
those with disabilities, and the goal of a safe and secure income level
for those with significant health conditions and functional limitations
who are unable to work. Policymakers must also decide how to strike a
balance between policies that directly intervene in the marketplace,
such as regulations and quotas, and those that indirectly affect market
outcomes via taxes, subsidies, or public investments to improve the
productivity of people with disabilities (e.g., through education, reha-
bilitation, or job support). 
Here, we review the evidence provided in the preceding chapters,
weigh the sometimes contradictory nature of that evidence, and pro-
vide a first attempt at relating the body of this evidence to policy
changes that should be considered by those interested in reversing both
the decline in the employment of working-aged people with disabilities
and their increasing dependence on government income support pro-
grams.
DID THE EMPLOYMENT RATE DECLINE?
All of the authors agree on the following three points:
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1) The employment rate for working-aged adults with disabilities,
broadly defined, has declined during the 1990s, both absolutely
and relative to the rate for those without disabilities.
2) The proportion of people with disabilities who say they are able
to work at all declined during the same period.
3) The employment rate for those with disabilities who say they are
able to work at all increased.
We briefly discuss each of these points below.
The Declining Employment Rate of Working-Aged Adults with 
Disabilities, Broadly Defined
Using data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), Houtenville
and Daly (Chapter 3) find that the employment rate of working-aged
people with self-reported work limitations was 40.8 percent at the peak
of the business cycle in 1989. By the peak of the next business cycle, in
2000, it had dropped by 8 percentage points, to 32.8 percent. By com-
parison, the employment rate of working-aged people without work
limitations increased by 1.9 percentage points, from 86.3 percent to
88.1 percent over the same period. Thus, the gap between the employ-
ment rates of people with and without work limitations increased, by
about 10 percentage points.
The validity of the CPS employment rate measure has been called
into question because of the possible sensitivity of the size and compo-
sition of the population who consider themselves to have work limita-
tions to changes in the policy and economic environment. Kruse and
Schur (Chapter 8) provide an extensive discussion of this issue.
The work limitation measure of the working-aged population with
disabilities leaves much to be desired, but Burkhauser and coauthors
(Chapter 2) provide convincing evidence that the decline in employ-
ment in the CPS data among those reporting a work limitation is real,
and not merely an artifact of that data set or the work limitation ques-
tion. To arrive at this conclusion, they compare employment trends
from the CPS with employment trends from the National Health Inter-
view Survey (NHIS) and the Survey of Income and Program Participa-
tion (SIPP). NHIS and SIPP support a richer variety of disability
definitions, including ones that we would expect to be less sensitive to
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the economic and policy environment. Although estimates of the size
of the working-aged population with disabilities vary significantly
across surveys, and across definitions of disability within surveys, in
any given year, the authors find declining employment trends regard-
less of the survey used, and whether the working-aged population with
a disability is defined broadly, based on a self-reported impairment,
more narrowly as a limitation in any major activity, still more narrowly
as any work limitation, and most narrowly as a work limitation that is
reported in each of two interviews, one year apart.
If any doubt remains about whether the declines in the measured
employment rates reflect real declines in employment, those doubts
have to be dispelled by growth in the share of working-aged adults who
receive SSDI or SSI (see Burkhauser et al., Chapter 2, and Goodman
and Waidmann, Chapter 10). The tight relationship between the num-
ber of working-aged males who are not employed and who report work
limitations, and the number of males receiving SSDI benefits, demon-
strated by Bound and Waidmann (2002), is particularly compelling
evidence that the survey measures are capturing a real phenomenon. 
The Proportion of People with Disabilities Who Say They 
Are Able to Work at All Declined
This finding is perhaps not remarkable given the employment rate
decline, but the magnitude of the decline is. For the population with
work limitations, the CPS shows a decline in the proportion able to
work at all, from 78 percent in 1988 to 73.2 percent in 1993, then, after
a break in the series owing to a change in the CPS, an additional drop
from 52.8 percent in 1994 to 45.4 percent in 2000. The NHIS shows a
decline from 49.8 percent in 1988 to 40.7 percent in 1996, the last year
of the data (Burkhauser et al., Chapter 2, Appendix 2C, Table C.4).
Kaye (Chapter 6) finds similar declines using slightly different years of
data and definitions of the population with disabilities.
The Employment Rate for Those with Disabilities Who Say They 
Are Able to Work at All Increased
Employment among the CPS male “able to work at all” population
fell slightly during the recession, from 54.7 percent in 1989 to 51.7 per-
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cent in 1992, but then, after a definitional change in the series,
increased from 61.6 percent in 1994 to 64.2 percent in 2000. The
employment rate based on a similar measure from the NHIS fell from
85.1 percent in 1989 to 82.8 percent in 1992 and then increased to 86.3
percent in 1996, the last year of the data (Burkhauser et al., Chapter 2,
Appendix 2A, Table 2A.5). Kaye (Chapter 6) finds similar increases
using slightly different years of data and definitions of the population
with disabilities. These increases are comparable to increases in the
employment rate for people without work limitations.
WHICH MEASURE OF THE EMPLOYMENT RATE SHOULD 
WE FOCUS ON?
Although all authors agree that the employment rate of working-
aged adults with disabilities, broadly defined, has decreased, and the
rate for those who report being “able to work at all” has increased,
there is disagreement about which measure is most relevant for pur-
poses of understanding recent history and informing the public policy
debate.
If we are interested in measuring the extent to which progress is
being made toward the broad goals articulated in the ADA—greater
inclusion of people with disabilities in major social activities, including
work, and greater economic independence—we should be interested in
the employment rate for all people with disabilities, regardless of
whether they report they are able to work at all. To do otherwise
ignores the aspirations for increased economic independence and
social integration of a large share of people with disabilities.
Beyond this, however, is there something to be learned for policy
purposes from analysis of the employment rate for only those who say
they are able to work at all? Kaye (Chapter 6) argues that the answer
depends on why the share of the population with disabilities who report
being able to work at all has decreased. If the reason for the decline is
an increase in the severity of medical conditions, then, according to
Kaye, trends in the employment rate for those who are able to work at
all tell us something meaningful about those for whom work is a realis-
tic option. If, on the other hand, reports of inability to work are sensi-
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tive to the economic and policy environment, then looking at rates for
only those who report being able to work at all misses an important,
perhaps definitive, component of the effects of the economic and pol-
icy environment on employment (see Burkhauser et al., Chapter 2, and
DeLeire, Chapter 7).
Kruse and Schur (Chapter 8) present an argument that is similar to
Kaye’s, although it is more focused on the ADA. They point out that
the ADA was only intended to improve employment opportunities for
those who are able to work at all, at least with reasonable accommoda-
tion. Therefore, for purposes of assessing the impact of the ADA, they
would have us look at a narrower population, one that includes only
those who report they are able to work at all.
If we can confidently rule out the hypothesis that change in the
economic and policy environment affects the proportion saying they
are able to work at all, then we can sharpen our understanding of the
effects of the economic and policy environment by examining just
those who are affected. But Kaye’s evidence does not convince us that
the proportion saying they are able to work at all is immune to the eco-
nomic and policy environment. In fact, our understanding of that envi-
ronment and reading of the evidence lead us to the opposite conclusion.
We discuss why as we consider the evidence presented in this volume.
Concerning arguments that the ADA employment provisions only
apply to a subset of the population, we echo the counterargument made
by DeLeire (Chapter 7) and Goodman and Waidmann (Chapter 10):
there is much ambiguity in the minds of employers, consumers, and
courts about who is protected and who is not. Given this, it should not
be surprising if the ADA affects employment outcomes for people who
are not in its intended target population. We can hardly take comfort in
the fact that the employment rate for people with disabilities who say
they are able to work at all increased after the ADA unless we can rule
out the possibility that the ADA contributed to the significant decline
in the proportion of people with disabilities who say they are able to
work at all. 
In sum, we think it a mistake to rely on the employment rate of
people with disabilities who say they are able to work at all as an indi-
cator of the progress being made toward improving employment out-
comes for people with disabilities. The evidence convinces us that the
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economic and policy environment has had an effect on the proportion
of people with disabilities who say they are able to work at all.
WHAT CAUSED THE EMPLOYMENT RATE DECLINE?
The previous chapters consider the following possible explanations of
the employment rate decline:
• Changes in the composition of the working-aged population of
people with disabilities: Houtenville and Daly (Chapter 3) focus
on the demographics and education of the population. 
• Changes in the nature of work that affects the ability of people
with disabilities to compete with other workers (Stapleton, Good-
man, and Houtenville, Chapter 4).
• Growth in health care costs that, given the way health care is
financed, make work less attractive for people with disabilities
who have chronic, high-cost health conditions (Hill, Livermore,
and Houtenville, Chapter 5).
• Increases in the severity of impairments and health conditions
among those with disabilities (Kaye, Chapter 6).
• The ADA (DeLeire, Chapter 7; Kruse and Schur, Chapter 8; and
Blanck, Schwochau, and Song, Chapter 9).
• Expansions of the SSDI and SSI programs, including both lower-
ing eligibility standards and increasing the relative benefits for
low-wage earners (Goodman and Waidmann, Chapter 10).
As we discuss below, the evidence presented by the relevant
authors rules out changes in demographics and education as major
causes of the decline. It also indicates that the growth in health care
costs and changes in the nature of work cannot account for much of the
decline, although they might have contributed to the decline for some.
We find this evidence compelling.
At least one chapter supports as the single major cause each of the
following potential causes of the decline:
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• Increases in the severity of impairments and health conditions
among those with disabilities (Kaye, Chapter 6);
• The unintended consequences of the passage and implementation
of the ADA (DeLeire, Chapter 7); and
• Eligibility and benefit expansions in the SSDI and SSI programs
(Goodman and Waidmann, Chapter 10).
In what follows, we summarize the evidence on the potential
causes that we agree can be ruled out, and provide a more in-depth and
critical review of the evidence on these three remaining potential
causes.
Demographics and Education
Houtenville and Daly (Chapter 3) focus on the sex, age, race, and
educational composition of the population (aged 25–61) with work
limitations. Although there were substantial changes to the age and
educational distributions of this population from 1989 to 2000 (mirror-
ing changes in the general population), if anything these changes
favored groups of adults with work limitations who have relatively
high employment rates: those with at least some college education.
Using a standard decomposition technique, they show that the decline
of the employment rate for adults with work limitations would have
been greater if the age, sex, race, and education composition of the
population with work limitations had stayed constant, holding constant
the decline within each age, sex, race, and education group.
A second finding from their analysis is that the decline in the
employment rate is widespread, crossing all age, sex, race, and educa-
tion groups, although it is greater for some groups than for others. The
decline is particularly high for men. Based on the CPS, the employ-
ment rate for men with work limitations fell by 10.9 percentage points,
from 44 percent in 1989 to 33.1 percent in 2000, compared with a 4.9
percentage point decline for women, from 37.5 percent to 32.6 percent.
The larger decline for men reflects the substantial rise in the employ-
ment rate for women relative to men without work limitations. Hence,
the size of the decline for men is perhaps a better indicator of the mag-
nitude of the impacts of whatever force(s) caused the decline in the
employment rate for people with work limitations than the decline for
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men and women together. Further, the smaller decline for women with
work limitations is not an indication that the impacts of those forces
were smaller for women.
Another notable feature of the decline in the employment rate is
that it is greater for young adults (aged 25–44) than for older ones
(aged 45–61), regardless of race, sex, or education. This is especially
troubling because young adults have many more years than older
adults before they would be expected to leave the labor force. We
would also expect the decline in the employment rate for the younger
group in the last decade to be reflected in future declines in the rate for
the older group, as those in the younger group age into it. 
The main point, however, is that the employment rate declined for
all major demographic and educational groups. Thus, it seems likely
that whatever forces have caused the decline are forces that affect all
groups, but perhaps have their largest effect on those who are young. 
The Nature of Work
Stapleton and coauthors (Chapter 4) consider how changes in the
nature of work might have affected the ability of adults with disabili-
ties to compete for jobs with other adults. From their perspective, the
decline in the employment rate of people with work limitations relative
to that of people without work limitations is viewed as a decline in the
proportion of jobs that are filled by people with work limitations. That
proportion was remarkably stable from the mid 1980s to the mid
1990s, and declined sharply during the second half of the latter decade. 
Although changes in the nature of work are difficult to quantify,
the authors provide evidence of some significant changes. In doing so,
they distinguish between static job characteristics—those seen in a
“snapshot” of a job at a point in time—and dynamic characteristics,
particularly the frequency with which workers change jobs. Based on
existing research about the nature of changing work, they conclude that
changes in static characteristics of jobs are likely to disadvantage some
workers with work limitations but be an advantage to others; that is,
there is no reason to expect an overall positive or negative effect of
changes in static characteristics on the proportion of jobs filled by peo-
ple with disabilities. On the other hand, they expect that an increase in
involuntary job loss is likely to disadvantage many workers with dis-
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abilities relative to those without disabilities because of the greater
challenges they face in finding and starting a new job.
Although not entirely definitive, the evidence they present shows
that changes in the nature of work seen during the 1990s began in the
1980s, if not earlier—and well before the start of the decline in the pro-
portion of jobs filled by workers with limitations. Further, there is no
evidence of an acceleration of change that could account for the sharp
decline in the proportion of workers with limitations after the mid-
1990s. Instead, the changes have been gradual and long-term. They do
identify two changes that seem to be making it more difficult for peo-
ple with disabilities to compete, on average, over the long term: a grad-
ual increase in educational and skill requirements, and a gradual
decline in job security, but the magnitude of these gradual changes is
too small to contribute much to the decline in the proportion of workers
with limitations. The main causes of the decline must lie elsewhere. 
Health Care Costs
Hill and coauthors (Chapter 5) examine the effect that increases in
health care costs, and concomitant changes in the way health care is
financed, have on the employment rate. This explanation has consider-
able appeal given the rising cost of health care and the higher-than-
average health care expenditures of people with disabilities. There is
also considerable documentation that people with disabilities fre-
quently cite access to health insurance as a main reason for not work-
ing.
The authors present two complementary analyses, and find mixed
results. The first, using the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey
(NMES) and the 1996 and 1997 Medical Expenditure Panel Surveys
(MEPS), considers changes in employment rates from 1987 to 1996–
1997 for individuals who have chronic conditions, regardless of dis-
ability, grouped by the costs of health care for those conditions. They
find that the share of the population with high-cost chronic conditions
increased over this period, and that the employment rate for those with
high-cost conditions fell relative to that for those with lower-cost
chronic conditions or without chronic conditions. This evidence is con-
sistent with the hypothesis that growing health care expenditures con-
tributed to the decline in the employment rate, but the authors note that
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it is based on all working-aged persons, not just those who report a dis-
ability. Comparability issues for the two surveys prevent them from
making similar comparisons among those who report disability (e.g.,
work limitations) only.
They therefore turn to the NHIS. They are able to compare the
employment rates of persons with work limitations with and without
high-cost chronic conditions in 1984–1987 with those for the same
groups in 1993–1996, using the high-cost condition group developed
with the MEPS and NMES data. This analysis yields mixed results. For
women with work limitations, the employment rate for those with
high-cost chronic conditions fell relative to the rate for others, as we
would expect if growing health care costs contributed to the employ-
ment rate decline. For men with work limitations, however, the
employment rate for those with high-cost chronic conditions did not
fall relative to others. If growth in health care costs explains the result
for women, it is not apparent why the result for men would be any dif-
ferent.
Finally, as was done in some of the earlier chapters, these authors
conduct a decomposition exercise. They find that, for both men and
women, growth in the prevalence of high-cost chronic conditions com-
bined with changes in the employment rate for those with work limita-
tions who have such conditions, has depressed the employment rate for
people with work limitations. The size of this effect, however, was
small relative to changes in the employment rates for men and women
that were observed during the same period (on the order of 10 percent). 
Given the intuitive appeal of the hypothesis the authors have exam-
ined, it is perhaps surprising that they, and others, have not found evi-
dence that growth in health care costs, and changes in financing, have
contributed more substantially to the decline in the employment rate.
Although it could be that data and methodological issues conspire to
obscure the effect, another possible reason emerges from their analysis.
Although people with work limitations, on average, have higher health
care costs than others, those health care costs are concentrated among a
very small share of people with work limitations; less than 7 percent of
those with work limitations had high-cost chronic conditions in 1993–
1996, based on Hill and coauthors’ estimates. We suspect that growth
in health care costs depressed the employment rate for those with high-
cost chronic conditions, but this effect cannot explain much of the
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decline in the employment rate for people with work limitations
because such a small share of people with work limitations have high-
cost chronic conditions.
Severity of Health Conditions and Impairments 
Kaye (Chapter 6) argues that changes in the type and severity of
underlying health conditions can explain the decline in the proportion
of people with disabilities who say they are able to work at all and,
thus, the decline in the overall employment rate of working-aged peo-
ple with disabilities found in the other chapters. All the previous chap-
ters primarily used CPS or NHIS data to examine the employment rate
of those who report a work limitation. In contrast, Kaye focuses on a
somewhat broader population, those with “any major activity limita-
tion” (including a work limitation). This is not, however, a critical dif-
ference; as shown by Burkhauser and coauthors (Chapter 2), the long-
term employment rate trends for those with any activity limitation are
quite similar to trends for those with work limitations only.
Kaye argues that:
• Responses to condition and impairment questions in the NHIS are
not subject to social environmental factors, and, based on these
data, the prevalence of conditions that are most commonly indi-
cated as the cause of an activity limitation grew for the working-
aged population from 1988 to 1996. 
• For the conditions reported, the proportion of individuals with
each condition who report an activity limitation, or say they can-
not work, remained constant. 
• If increases in the overall prevalence of disability or inability to
work at all were because of environmental factors, such as dis-
ability benefits or the ADA, these proportions would have
increased. Because they did not, neither of these two responses is
influenced by the social environment. Instead, growth in the
inability to work at all rate for those with activity limitations is
caused by an increase in the prevalence of conditions that have
low rates.
Although we agree that responses to questions about conditions
and impairments are less likely to be affected by social environmental
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factors and that the prevalence of such conditions increased during part
of the 1990s, we do not find the rest of Kaye’s argument convincing.
Part of the problem is that he focuses on activity limitation and inabil-
ity to work rates for the working-aged population as a whole, rather
than the proportion of those with activity limitations who are unable to
work at all. This would be fine if activity limitation prevalence and
inability-to-work rates were growing in lock step with each other, but
they are not. That fact is not evident from the data unless we directly
examine the proportion of those with activity limitations who are
unable to work at all.
For the conditions in the NHIS checklist, Kaye provides estimates
of overall prevalence, prevalence of activity limitations owing to the
conditions, and prevalence of inability to work at all owing to the con-
dition. Data on actual and predicted prevalence of activity limitations
and prevalence of inability to work at all owing to these conditions
(Chapter 6, Figure 6.15) seem to confirm the second and third points in
the list. If, however, one considers the proportion of those with activity
limitations owing to one of these conditions who report an inability to
work at all, there is evidence of an increase (Figure 11.1), from 37.7
percent in 1988 to 41.1 percent in 1996—a 9.8 percent increase.1 Fur-
ther, as illustrated in the figure, Kaye’s models for the prevalence of
activity limitations and prevalence of inability to work at all do not pre-
dict this increase.2 The increase in the proportion of those unable to
work at all among those with activity limitations owing to a checklist
condition is very comparable to the increase in the corresponding pro-
portion for all conditions, as reported by Kaye; the proportion for all
conditions increased from 39.9 in 1988 to 44.5 in 1996, an 11.5 percent
increase.
In sum, growth in the prevalence of activity limitations owing to
checklist conditions primarily reflects overall growth in the prevalence
of these conditions, but the growth in the proportion of those with
activity limitations who say they are unable to work at all is greater
than expected, owing to growth in prevalence of these conditions
alone. Put differently, Kaye’s data are consistent with the following
conclusion: it appears that changes in the policy and economic envi-
ronment have not affected the rate of self-reported activity limitations
from checklist conditions, but have increased the proportion of those
with activity limitations who say they are unable to work at all. 
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Figure 11.1 Percentage of Persons with Affective Disorders Who Report 
an Activity Limitation or Inability to Work
SOURCE: Calculations by the authors, using data provided by Kaye (Chapter 6). The
actual series is the estimate of the proportion unable to work due to checklist condi-
tions divided by the proportion reporting a major activity limitation due to the same
conditions. The predicted series is the ratio of Kaye’s predictions for the same series.
The above applies to the checklist conditions only, and does not
apply to one very important condition that is omitted from the check-
lists: affective disorders (depression and bipolar disorder). Kaye does,
however, provide some information on trends in prevalence of the con-
dition, activity limitations owing to the condition, and inability to work
at all owing to the condition, based on whether the respondent visited
any physician (including psychiatrists, but excluding non-physician
providers) because of the disorder in the past two weeks. We agree
with Kaye that the 62 percent increase from 1988 to 1996 in this mea-
sure of the condition’s prevalence is likely due, in substantial part, to
the availability of new pharmacological treatments and a decline in
stigma. What is more astonishing is the growth in reported activity lim-
itations and in inability to work at all owing to these conditions, rela-
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indicates that the proportion of those with affective disorders who
report an activity limitation roughly doubled, as did the proportion
reporting inability to work at all. The evidence should be treated with
caution because those with affective disorders that are most likely to
limit their activities are perhaps also most likely to obtain new treat-
ments. We would expect, however, that new treatments would reduce
the real proportion of those with affective disorders who report an
activity limitation, as well as the proportion reporting inability to work
at all. This makes the growth in activity limitations and inability to
work at all owing to these conditions even more troubling.
Kaye provides evidence on two possible causes of the increase in
the prevalence of disabling conditions: growth in the prevalence of
obesity and the recession of 1990–1991. It does seem likely that
increased obesity has contributed to both activity limitations and the
inability to work at all, although we think further work needs to be
done to assess the size of its contribution.3 We are not surprised that
timing of growth in inability to work at all appears to be linked to the
recession, but we think the mechanism for the link is probably quite
different than the one that Kaye posits. When people lose their jobs in a
downturn, they look for alternative sources of income. The SSDI pro-
gram is a potential income source for people with disabilities, but to
qualify, the applicant must claim to be unable to work for at least a year
at any job. Although we are willing to accept the argument that job loss
does damage the health of some individuals, as some research shows, it
is much harder for us to believe that a recession could cause the large
and sustained impact on health that Kaye reports. 
Kaye’s analysis ends in 1996, owing to changes in the NHIS. As
Burkhauser and coauthors (Chapter 2) find, the decline in the employ-
ment rate for men and women with work limitations continued through
2000. Houtenville and Daly (Chapter 3) conduct an analysis for 1995–
2000 that casts further doubt on the hypothesis that increases in the
severity of impairments among those with work limitations is the prin-
cipal cause of the decline in the employment rate. The CPS started to
include a health status question in 1995. Houtenville and Daly find
that, from 1995 through 2000, there is no trend in the distribution of the
health status variable for those with work limitations, and the employ-
ment rate decline is as large, if not larger, for those who report rela-
tively good health than for those who report relatively poor health.
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Although health status and impairment severity are clearly not synony-
mous concepts, there is a strong statistical relationship between impair-
ment measures and health status measures in the NHIS and other data
sets where measures for both concepts are available. Hence, the find-
ings of Houtenville and Daly would be surprising if the real cause of
the employment rate decline among those with work limitations during
the last half of the 1990s was an increase in the severity of their impair-
ments.
Hence, we conclude that the main cause of the employment rate
decline of working-aged people with disabilities lies elsewhere. Like-
wise, we conclude that the positive trend in the employment rate of the
subset of working-aged people with disabilities who say they are able
to work at all is a misleading indicator of the employment outcomes of
working-aged people with disabilities because the declining share of
this subset of the population is not driven by a purely exogenous
decline in their health, but by changes in the social environment that all
workers with disabilities face. Below we consider the two most impor-
tant changes in that social environment in the 1990s. 
The Americans with Disabilities Act
Is it possible that the ADA, intended to increase employment
opportunities for people with disabilities and reduce their economic
dependence, could have had the opposite effect? DeLeire (Chapter 7)
would say yes, primarily based on evidence from his own work
(DeLeire 2000a, 2000b, and 2001) and that of Acemoglu and Angrist
(2001). Kruse and Schur (Chapter 8), however, say no, and Blanck and
coauthors (Chapter 9) think it is premature to draw a conclusion. 
It appears that the participants in this debate would all agree that
the direction of the theoretical impact of the ADA on employment is
ambiguous. On the one hand, the cost to employers of potential litiga-
tion from discrimination against people with disabilities ought to dis-
courage unjust terminations. However, this same cost can be avoided
through increased discrimination in hiring. As the authors point out,
most ADA litigation is over termination; discrimination in hiring is
much more difficult to detect, let alone prove, and perhaps much less
likely to be reported. Therefore, it is possible that the ADA has tipped
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the balance against hiring people with disabilities and thus offset any
gains from reduced terminations. 
The ADA’s requirement that employers provide reasonable
accommodations increases the cost of employing a worker who needs
an accommodation, whether an existing worker or a job applicant,
again potentially discouraging employment. Although studies of
accommodations have shown that many are inexpensive, as DeLeire
(Chapter 7) points out, these studies do not consider the hard-to-mea-
sure costs of accommodations, such as flexible schedules, or the cost of
accommodations that employers have been unwilling to make. 
On the other hand, the implementation of the ADA was accompa-
nied by a substantial effort to educate employers on accommodating
workers with disabilities, and it provides some subsidies for that pur-
pose. In general, the ADA advanced the expectation that employers
take an objective look at what an individual with a disability can do
rather than automatically discount the individual’s ability.
As both DeLeire (Chapter 7) and Kruse and Schur (Chapter 8)
point out, the consensus among economists is that the Civil Rights Act
(CRA) of 1964 increased employment opportunities for African-Amer-
icans, and none dispute this conclusion—although, again, the direction
of the expected effect was ambiguous. Two features of the ADA make
it different from the CRA, however: mandated employer accommoda-
tions and the difficulty of determining who qualifies for ADA protec-
tion. The latter creates the possibility of lawsuits from many whom the
law does not intend to protect.
Ultimately, the question of the ADA’s impact on employment of
people with disabilities is an empirical issue, and a very difficult one at
that. DeLeire and others contend that the decline in the employment
rate for people with disabilities, which began at about the time the
ADA was passed and implemented, is evidence of a negative impact,
just as growth in the employment rate of African-Americans in the lat-
ter half of the 1960s was evidence of the positive impact of the CRA. It
is very difficult to draw this conclusion because of two other events:
the recession that coincided with ADA passage and implementation,
and expansions in the SSDI and SSI programs that began as early as
1984. Goodman and Waidmann (Chapter 10) argue that it is the combi-
nation of these latter events, rather than the ADA, that caused the
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employment rate to decline. Disentangling these competing effects is
highly problematic.
Kruse and Schur argue that the evidence that the ADA caused the
decline is flawed because the ADA was not intended to target the broad
population with work limitations captured by the employment rate
measures used by DeLeire and Acemoglu and Angrist (2001). They
argue that the relevant group is the subgroup with health conditions or
functional limitations that is able to work at all, an argument that is
echoed by Blanck and coauthors (Chapter 9), and they find that the
employment rate for those able to work at all increased.
DeLeire rejects this line of reasoning because he views disability
as the outcome of an interaction between a medical condition and a
person’s environment. Some of those who consider themselves work-
limited or unable to work at all in the absence of an accommodation
might not think so when an accommodation becomes available. In fact,
Kruse and Schur make this same point. More generally, DeLeire agrees
with a point we have made previously: policy changes can, and do,
have an impact on the proportion of people with disabilities who report
they are unable to work at all. We would also add that the ambiguity of
the ADA’s disability definition, and its interpretation in the courts,
leaves open the question of whether all ADA impacts are limited to its
target population. In fact, Kruse and Schur allow for the possibility of
this problem, but argue that it can ultimately be dismissed, and do so in
their preferred results. 
At the same time that we disagree with Kruse and Schur about their
use of a narrow subgroup of people with disabilities to assess the
impact of the ADA, we agree with their observation that measured
compositional changes in those who report work limitations did occur,
and that those compositional changes might help discriminate between
the hypothesis that the ADA caused the overall decline in the employ-
ment rate of working-aged people with disabilities and the hypothesis
that it was owing to expansions in the SSDI and SSI programs. We will
return to this issue at the end of our discussion of the role played by
those programs.
Blanck and coauthors also make a point about the ADA that is
worth repeating. The ADA might have had a significant impact on the
culture of disability, which could have long-term positive effects on
employment. It has probably increased the visibility of people with dis-
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abilities who do work. It might have encouraged many people with dis-
abilities to attempt work and to invest in their ability to work.
Similarly, it might have encouraged educators, providers, and advo-
cates to see work and independence as a desirable and achievable goal,
and it might have encouraged employers and workers without disabili-
ties to look more objectively at the capabilities of workers with disabil-
ities.
SSDI and SSI Expansions
All of the evidence we have seen is consistent with the hypothesis
that SSDI and SSI expansions interacted with the recession to cause a
long-term reduction in the employment rate of people with disabilities.
Goodman and Waidmann (Chapter 10) provide a comprehensive pre-
sentation of the evidence, primarily based on articles by Bound and
Waidmann (2002) and Autor and Duggan (2003). In short: 
• Increases in the SSDI rolls closely tracked the employment rate
of those with disabilities who are insured for SSDI. 
• Eligibility was primarily expanded by lowering the medical list-
ings for the two impairment groups—musculoskeletal and psy-
chiatric—that also account for a very large share of the increase
in reported inability to work at all.
• Because of variation in wage growth and the way benefits are
indexed to average wage growth, SSDI replacement rates
increased for low-wage workers, and growth in the number of
such workers on the SSDI rolls was much greater than for others.
• SSDI applications have become more sensitive to the business
cycle, which is what we would expect from an expansion in eligi-
bility. This is because eligibility expansion creates more “condi-
tional applicants,” that is, workers who might qualify if not
working, and who seek benefits when they lose their job during a
downturn. Benefit expansions for those with low wages also
encourage them to apply (Autor and Dugan 2003). 
Skeptics, however, offer two arguments. First, they argue that the
timing is off—eligibility expansions occurred too early relative to the
employment rate decline and growth in program participation. Second,
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they argue that the employment rate for workers with disabilities
declined for some other reason, and SSDI and SSI participation
increased as a response, as those who could not work or find jobs
sought income support. 
The timing argument reflects a lack of understanding about the
nature of the expansions and how their impact on employment and pro-
gram participation is related to the business cycle. As described more
fully by Goodman and Waidmann (Chapter 10), although the eligibility
expansion began in 1984, it continued for many years as regulations
were developed and important cases worked their way through the
courts. This is a well-documented fact, and is well known by program
administrators. Further, strong economic growth during the late 1980s
meant that many new conditional applicants had no need to apply for
benefits until the recession of 1990–1991. Perhaps the strongest indica-
tor of the eligibility expansion is that the allowance rate remained
unchanged, or even increased, as the number of applicants grew rap-
idly. If an external force drove the rapid growth in applications, we
would expect a decline in the allowance rate, as individuals with less
serious impairments sought benefits. We find this evidence convinc-
ing.
It is more difficult to rule out the possibility that some external
force caused both the decline in the employment rate and the increase
in SSDI and SSI program participation. The two candidates for such an
external force that are promoted by authors in this book are growth in
the severity of impairments (Kaye, Chapter 6) and the ADA (DeLeire,
Chapter 7). For reasons discussed above, we conclude that the evi-
dence rules out increase in the severity of impairments as the cause. It
is more difficult to discount the evidence for the ADA. Kruse and
Schur (Chapter 8) and Blanck and coauthors (Chapter 9) argue that we
should look only at the subgroup of the population targeted by the
ADA. We are convinced, however, that the sensitivity to the social
environment of self-reported inability to work at all, and the more
overriding public policy perspective of considering the employment
and economic well-being of all working-aged people with disabilities,
requires us to focus on the broader population. 
Hence, we are left with the question: Is the wide variety of evi-
dence that appears in this volume more consistent with the ADA
hypothesis or the SSDI and SSI hypothesis? Unfortunately, much of it
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is consistent with both. We agree with Goodman and Waidmann
(Chapter 10) that some facts appear to favor the SSDI and SSI hypoth-
esis. The three we find of greatest significance are:
1) The increase in the SSDI and SSI allowance rates. Eligibility
expansions are expected to increase allowance rates, at least ini-
tially. If an external force such as the ADA induces SSDI and SSI
applications, we would expect the average induced applicant to
have a lower chance of allowance than the average applicant who
would have applied anyway.
2) The decline in the employment rate is greatest for those with
musculoskeletal or psychiatric impairments. These are the disor-
ders for which SSDI and SSI eligibility standards are most rele-
vant. We see no reason why the ADA would have its greatest
impact on the employment of those with these disorders.
3) Employment rate reductions were highest among those with low
earnings (Autor and Duggan 2003). This is the group that experi-
enced a substantial expansion of their SSDI replacement rate.
There is no apparent reason why the ADA would adversely affect
this group more than others.
However, DeLeire points out three facts that appear to favor the
ADA explanation:
1) Employment declines for workers with disabilities were greater
in medium-sized firms than in small or large firms (Acemoglu
and Angrist 2001). Small firms are exempt from ADA accommo-
dation requirements, and there is good reason to believe that
medium-sized firms would find ADA compliance more difficult
than large ones. There is no apparent reason to think that SSDI
and SSI expansions would reduce employment of people with
disabilities at medium-sized firms relative to others.
2) Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) conclude that state employment
rate declines for people with disabilities post-ADA are positively
related to the number of Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC) charges in the state. 
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3) Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) find employment rate declines
associated with the ADA’s implementation even after omitting
SSDI beneficiaries from their samples. 
To date, proponents of one or the other of these public policies as
the more important in explaining the decline in employment of work-
ing-aged people with disabilities in the 1990s have failed to reconcile
the conflicts in the above evidence. Difficult questions that need to be
addressed include:
• Are there reasons why the ADA would increase SSDI and SSI
allowance rates?
• Are there reasons why the ADA would reduce the employment of
people with musculoskeletal or psychiatric impairments more
than those with other conditions?
• Are there reasons why the ADA would reduce the employment of
those with low skills more than others?
• Are there reasons why SSDI and SSI eligibility expansions would
reduce the employment of workers with disabilities in medium-
sized firms more than in large or small ones?
• Does the cross-state association between EEOC charges and the
employment rate decline remain after controlling for the cross-
state variability in the effects of SSDI and SSI eligibility expan-
sions in combination with the 1990 recession? 
• How can we reconcile the Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) finding
that the employment rate decline associated with the ADA
remains even after omitting SSDI beneficiaries from the sample
with the finding that the proportion of men who are unable to
work at all owing to a health condition tracks very tightly with the
number of male SSDI beneficiaries (Bound and Waidmann
2002)?
We do not have satisfactory answers to any of these questions, and
it is not obvious that they will ever be answered to anybody’s complete
satisfaction.4 Although our judgment to date is that the weight of the
evidence favors the SSDI-SSI expansion explanation over the ADA
explanation, our comfort level with that conclusion is not as high as we
would like it to be.
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We are convinced, however, that there has been a real, and sub-
stantial, decline in the employment rate of people with disabilities, and
that it was caused by a change in public policy. If there were some
other cause, why would the effect be observed across all demographic,
education, and health groups? One possible answer to this question is
growth in the severity of disabling physical and mental conditions, but,
as discussed earlier, the evidence does not support this explanation. It
seems very unlikely that several different factors coincidentally caused
a substantial decline in the employment rate for people with disabilities
that spanned all groups.
It is unlikely that there is some other major cause of the employ-
ment rate decline that we have somehow overlooked, although one has
been suggested by Kruse and Schur: the tightening of workers’ com-
pensation eligibility and payment rules in response to the rapid growth
in workers’ compensation costs during the previous two decades. This
is an intriguing suggestion, and one that is worth looking into further. It
is possible that tightening of state workers’ compensation programs
induced more injured workers to leave their jobs and obtain SSDI ben-
efits for lack of temporary or permanent-partial support. Tightening
could also lead to the opposite effect, however, with injured workers
returning to work earlier to support themselves and their families. We
would be surprised if tightening of workers’ compensation programs is
the explanation for the employment rate decline, but perhaps it made a
contribution. If so, however, we are still left with the conclusion that
changes in public policy caused the decline. This explanation would
also reinforce perhaps the most important finding from decades of
research on the SSDI and SSI programs: the structure of income sup-
ports for people with disabilities has a substantial impact on their
employment.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
As discussed above, the evidence indicates that the widespread
employment rate decline for people with disabilities is a consequence
of public policies that were implemented in the late 1980s and early
1990s. The most important implication of this finding is that we are
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very unlikely to see substantial improvement in employment outcomes
for people with disabilities in the near future unless we change public
policy in very significant ways.
We are convinced that expansions of the SSDI and SSI programs
played a significant role in the employment rate decline. Those expan-
sions include both eligibility expansions and expansion in the value of
benefits relative to wages for low-wage workers. Although we are not
convinced that the ADA had a significantly negative effect on employ-
ment of working-aged people with disabilities, we also find no unam-
biguous evidence that it had a significant positive effect. At best, it
may have increased the employment of the decreasing share of that
population who report being able to work at all. This does not mean
that we should roll back the clock to the policies that were in place
before these changes. These changes were intended to address real, and
serious, problems. Many people with severe disabilities were being
denied SSDI and SSI benefits, in part because eligibility standards
were increased from 1979 to 1981, before being lowered again in 1984.
Similarly, the ADA was passed to address real discrimination in the
workplace and elsewhere against people with disabilities. Many states
did not have laws against such discrimination, and others found such
laws difficult to enforce.
What the findings in this book lead us to recognize is that attempts
to improve insurance protection against work loss owing to disability
or to reduce discrimination in employment can have the unintended
consequence of reducing employment. Hence, if we are to improve
employment outcomes, we must make changes in the way we provide
support for people with disabilities, and the way we protect their rights,
that will minimize the negative employment effects, or, better, encour-
age employment, while maintaining a reasonable level of income pro-
tection and protection against discrimination. 
Civil Rights
As discussed by DeLeire (Chapter 7), evidence of the positive
impact of the 1964 Civil Rights Act on employment of African-Ameri-
cans makes it clear that Civil Rights legislation can have a positive
impact on employment. We think that the ability of Civil Rights legis-
lation to induce employers to increase their hiring and retention of a
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protected class of workers critically depends on their assessment of the
costs and benefits of compliance. Regardless of what the impact of the
ADA has been on the employment of people with disabilities to date,
policy changes that increase the benefits of compliance or reduce the
costs for employers will improve the employment outcomes for people
with disabilities.
Before considering how public policy changes could encourage
compliance and improve employment outcomes, it is helpful to review
how the employer’s calculus of costs and benefits differs for existing
employees and job applicants. With respect to existing employees, the
main benefit of compliance is avoiding the cost of litigation and penal-
ties from lawsuits over termination and other issues (“retention bene-
fit”), and the main compliance cost is accommodation. With respect to
potential employees (i.e., job applicants), the main benefit of compli-
ance for employers is avoiding the cost of litigation and penalties from
lawsuits over hiring issues. There are two components of an
employer’s compliance costs with respect to potential employees:
accommodation costs, and the expected costs of lawsuits over future
termination and other issues (“termination cost”).
A critical feature of this calculus is that the litigation costs create a
benefit for employers who comply in the case of existing employees
(the retention benefit), but create a cost to employers who comply in
the case of job applicants (the termination cost). Thus, if policy
changes increase the employer’s costs via lawsuits over termination,
they will encourage employers to retain their current workers but dis-
courage them from hiring new ones. Some of the evidence that the
ADA reduced employment suggests that the reason is reduced hiring,
not increased terminations (Acemoglu and Angrist 2001). The conflict-
ing incentives created by the substantial numbers of lawsuits from
existing employees, and the relative rarity of lawsuits from job appli-
cants, could explain why.
Within this framework, the following three approaches to both
improving ADA compliance and employment outcomes have consid-
erable appeal:
1) Reduce the cost of employer accommodations through subsidies
or technical support (e.g., providing better information about effi-
cient accommodations),
396 Burkhauser and Stapleton
2) Increase efforts to enforce compliance in hiring, and
3) Clarify who is protected, under which circumstances they are pro-
tected, and what constitutes reasonable accommodation. 
We consider each of these approaches below. 
Reducing the cost of employer accommodations through subsidies
or technical support would reduce the employer’s cost of ADA compli-
ance for both existing employees and job applicants. As others have
pointed out, accommodation provisions of the ADA are a feature that
distinguishes it from the Civil Rights Act, and the compliance costs
that these provisions impose on employers is an important reason why
the two acts might have had opposite effects on the employment of
their protected classes. The ADA uses a stick to encourage employers
to hire people with disabilities. Although we consider how to increase
the size of this stick (see below), we also consider some carrots to bet-
ter achieve the goal of fully integrating working-aged people with dis-
abilities into employment. 
Increasing efforts to enforce compliance in hiring would increase
the hiring of applicants with disabilities by increasing the benefit to an
employer of compliance. Lawsuits concerning discrimination in hiring
are relatively rare, for a variety of possible reasons. The first is that it
can be very difficult for job applicants to detect discrimination, as they
do not know how their abilities compare with those of competing
applicants, and employers can usually offer plausible, seemingly legiti-
mate explanations for not hiring any given individual. The second is
that it is harder to establish that an applicant is capable of performing
the required work than to establish that an existing employee can,
because the latter is less likely to have performed it previously. The
third is that the typical applicant who has been the victim of discrimi-
nation probably has less incentive to pursue a lawsuit than the typical
victim who is an existing employee, for a variety of reasons (less
chance of success, a desire to focus their energy on searching for other
jobs, fear of creating a negative reputation for themselves, lack of sup-
port from fellow employees or employee organizations, and perhaps
others). Clarifying who is protected, under what circumstances they are
protected, and what constitutes reasonable accommodation would
reduce the costs to employers of lawsuits from existing employees in a
way that might significantly reduce their compliance cost for job appli-
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cants, without greatly reducing their compliance benefit for existing
employees. The reason is that the costs associated with nonmeritorious
lawsuits are likely to have a minimal effect on ADA compliance for
existing employees. They do impose costs, and employers likely take
actions to avoid those costs (e.g., retain an employee whom they have
legitimate reasons to terminate), but those actions do not necessarily
improve compliance, and could potentially harm it. 
The main effect of nonmeritorious lawsuits might be to discourage
the employer from hiring people who might bring such future lawsuits.
Another potentially important effect is to undermine both employer
and political support for the ADA in general. Of course, efforts to clar-
ify these issues are already under way, through the judicial process,
and it is possible that recent court decisions will have a significant
impact on ADA compliance and employment outcomes for people
with disabilities. There are significant problems with the court process,
however. It is slow, expensive, and often haphazard. Legislative or reg-
ulatory changes might be less expensive, speed up the process, and
lead to more desirable results. We believe, however, that successful
efforts to clarify whom the ADA protects, under what circumstances,
and what constitutes reasonable accommodation will significantly
reduce ADA compliance costs and increase the employment of people
with disabilities who are determined to be protected under the law—
especially through new hires.
In this regard, it is important to note that the empirical evidence
about the impact of the ADA on the employment of people with dis-
abilities has focused on the period immediately before and immedi-
ately after its creation (DeLeire 2001) or implementation (Acemoglu
and Angrist 2001). After more than a decade of judicial experience
with the act, most scholars would argue that, although we now have a
much clearer idea of who is protected by the act, the protected class has
been much more narrowly defined than might have been expected at
the time of its passage. (See Krieger 2000 for a fuller discussion of this
point and the major court decisions that have shaped the current pro-
tected class under the ADA.) This suggests that the net effect of the
ADA on the overall employment of working-aged people with disabili-
ties, whether positive or negative, is likely to be much less than its
impact as measured immediately after its passage, when the protected
class was considered by employers and employees alike to be larger.
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This judicial history has important implications for those who, in 1990,
hoped that the ADA would have a dramatic effect on the overall
employment of working-aged people with disabilities, and it returns us
to a major point of disagreement with respect to the success parameters
advocated by various authors in this book.
As ADA’s protected class has been more clearly, but more nar-
rowly, defined by the courts, it is possible that the employment rate of
this narrowly defined class has increased over time, while at the same
time the ADA has had a smaller impact on the overall employment rate
of working-aged people with disabilities. The logic is the same as that
of the success of the similarly shrinking population with disabilities
that is able to work at all. This plausible scenario further adds to our
concerns about the view that measures of the ADA success on employ-
ment should be confined to the population with disabilities that is cov-
ered by the law, most forcefully espoused by Blanck and coauthors
(Chapter 9). More important, it suggests that the ADA as currently
interpreted by the courts is unlikely to be the major vehicle for integrat-
ing working-aged people with disabilities into the labor market. 
Pro-Work Support Policies
Historically, the federal government’s approach to providing eco-
nomic security for people with disabilities has been dominated by a
caretaker approach, reflecting the outdated view that disability is solely
a medical issue. A main premise of this model is that people with
severe medical conditions are unable to work, and therefore cannot
contribute to their own economic security. The government, at the
insistence of advocates and others, has launched a multifaceted effort
to change that, epitomized by the passage of the ADA, but also
reflected in other legislation, such as the 1998 Individuals with Disabil-
ities Education Act (IDEA), the 1999 Ticket to Work and Work Incen-
tives Improvement Act (TW&WIIA), and in administration initiatives,
such as the Clinton administration’s Presidential Task Force on the
Employment of Adults with Disabilities, and the Bush administration’s
New Freedom Initiative (NFI).
A glance at federal budgets, however, shows that we have a long
way to go. Expenditures to support work as means to achieve economic
security are paltry when compared with expenditures for income sup-
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port and medical assistance. In fiscal year 2000, the federal and state
governments combined spent $81 billion for income support (SSDI
and SSI) and more than $84 billion for medical care (Medicare and
Medicaid) for working-aged adults with disabilities—more than $165
billion in total.5 In contrast, the federal appropriation for the Rehabilita-
tion Services Administration in fiscal year 2000 was under $3 billion,
and the appropriation for all Special Education programs was $6 bil-
lion.6
Much of the emphasis in the new pro-work policy initiatives is on
increasing the investment in the “human capital” of people with dis-
abilities (i.e., the skills they have), or in breaking down physical and
institutional barriers to the use of their existing human capital.
Increased investment in the human capital of children with disabilities,
through increased educational opportunities, is a main thrust of IDEA,
and most of the efforts encompassed by NFI could be reasonably char-
acterized as either promoting human capital, or addressing physical
barriers to use of existing human capital (e.g., through transportation
initiatives and increased access to technology). The ADA also attempts
to break down physical barriers to use of existing human capital, by
addressing the problems of labor market discrimination and employer
accommodation.
Increasing the investment in the human capital of people with dis-
abilities and reducing physical barriers seem like sensible approaches
to increasing the employment of people with disabilities and reducing
their dependence on government benefits.7 If the new policies succeed
in increasing human capital and reducing the physical barriers to its
use, they will likely result in some increase in the employment and eco-
nomic independence of this population. 
An important lesson from the evidence in this book, however, is
that pro-work support policies will be much more successful if they go
beyond investments in human capital. The decline in the employment
rate of people with disabilities was not caused by less investment in
their human capital or through the creation or reinforcement of physi-
cal barriers to its use; indeed, the opposite has occurred. Instead, the
decline occurred because of changes in the social environment—reduc-
tions in individuals’ incentives to work and reductions in employer
incentives to hire them. We addressed the issue of employer incentives
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in the previous section. We now turn to incentives for people with dis-
abilities.
Current income support policies, as well as many in-kind support
policies, continue to be strongly conditioned on earnings; the more you
earn, the less likely you are to be eligible for benefits, or the lower your
benefit payments. The message these programs send to people with
disabilities who can work is that “we will help you as long as you don’t
help yourself.” That message must be changed to one of “we will help
you, but we also expect you to help yourself as best you can, and we
will reward you for doing so.” If we are serious about changing the
approach to economic security for people with disabilities to one that
emphasizes using their abilities through employment, we need major
changes in support policies. Support policies must create incentives
rather than disincentives to work, and they must provide the supports
needed to achieve greater independence. Instead, current support poli-
cies force people with disabilities to choose between a reliable monthly
benefit check and other services, on the one hand, and supporting
themselves through work that might generate more income, but that
carries with it many challenges and risks, on the other.
TW&WIIA has several features intended to mitigate the work dis-
incentives embodied in the SSI and SSDI programs and their links to
Medicaid and Medicare. The Ticket to Work itself is intended to pro-
vide beneficiaries with more resources, and more control over
resources, needed to return to work and become financially indepen-
dent. It is also intended to give providers a stronger incentive to help
beneficiaries do so. Expansion of the Medicaid buy-in program for
people with disabilities and an extended period of eligibility for Medi-
care under the SSDI program are intended to weaken the link between
access to these programs and earnings. The easy-return provision is
intended to make it less risky for beneficiaries to give up their benefits
in favor of employment. The legislation also includes provisions for
SSA to experiment with other changes that would reduce disincentives
to work, most notably the $1 for $2 SSDI benefit offset, under which
beneficiaries would lose one dollar of SSDI benefits for each $2 earned
above some threshold, rather than retain all benefits for as long as earn-
ings are below the substantial gainful activity (SGA) level, then lose
them all when their earnings exceed SGA by even a dollar.
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Although TW&WIIA seems like a step in the right direction, it will
only reduce, not eliminate the work disincentives associated with sup-
port programs. The $1 for $2 SSDI benefit offset makes this obvious.
Even if it were implemented nationwide, rather than as a demonstra-
tion, beneficiaries would still face an implicit 50 percent tax on their
earnings, as do current SSI recipients and as did Social Security retire-
ment beneficiaries under age 70 until that long-standing feature of the
retirement program was finally repealed in 2000.8
Although TW&WIIA seems like a major effort to address the
incentive issue, it also seems small in comparison with the sweeping
changes to welfare policy that were made in the 1990s, with a similar
purpose: to encourage parents, especially single mothers, to support
themselves and their families through work rather than welfare bene-
fits. Although we think it is important not to take this analogy too far in
its application to disability policy, it is also important to draw on the
lessons of welfare reform to the extent that we can. Welfare reform has
not been a universal success, but it has been much more successful than
its early critics thought possible. There has been a clear increase in the
employment, earnings, and economic independence of single-parent
families, and the increase seems to be surviving the current economic
slowdown. Most observers of welfare reform appear to agree that three
features of the reforms have been critical.9 One is early intervention—
providing parents with emergency assistance when they have employ-
ment or other crises so that they can maintain an existing job, or find a
new one, rather than become dependent on benefits. A second is the
substantial expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). For
those parents with low earnings, the EITC makes an additional dollar
of earnings add substantially more than a dollar to income. A third is a
change in expectations. Most parents are now expected to support
themselves through work, and the government is expected to facilitate
that effort. 
The apparent successes of welfare reform are all the more remark-
able when contrasted with the lack of success from earlier reforms.
Earlier reforms emphasized investment in human capital, through edu-
cation and a series of employment and training programs. However,
whatever improvements in human capital were achieved were not con-
verted into greater earnings and economic independence. The success
of the more recent reforms suggests that the likely reason for the failure
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of earlier reforms is that welfare recipients did not have strong enough
incentives to invest in, and use, their own human capital. 
Perhaps we need a similar three-pronged change for people with
disabilities: more assistance to help them stay in their current job, or
find a new job when they lose it;10 an earned income tax credit for those
who work but have very low earnings;11 and for at least a substantial
share, an expectation that they will work and that government’s role is
to help them support themselves through work—an expectation that
seems in line with the intent of the ADA.
Such a policy would complement efforts to increase the human
capital of people with disabilities and break down physical barriers to
its use. It not only would help ensure that increased human capital and
reductions in barriers to its use would actually increase employment
and reduce economic dependence, but would also create incentives for
people with disabilities to invest more in themselves. 
There are significant challenges to developing such policies, how-
ever. One is the “woodwork effect”: workers who meet medical eligi-
bility criteria for support, but do not rely on support, will have more
incentive to seek support if they can obtain it without reducing their
earnings. Although one might argue that these individuals are worthy
of at least some support, the effect would be to increase program costs,
perhaps substantially. A second challenge is determining who should
be expected to work and who should not. Even if conceptual agreement
can be reached, the practical problem of making actual determinations
is enormous. A third challenge is determining how to provide support
for work, and how much support to provide. The target population is a
very heterogeneous one, as is their need for support. One size will not
fit all. We are a long way from devising public policies that will simul-
taneously provide a reasonable safety net for people with disabilities,
encourage employment, and provide sufficient job support to assure
that those who are able to work are integrated into the workforce. We
are convinced that such policies should be our goal, but policy change
must go well beyond current initiatives if substantial progress is to be
achieved. The first step in achieving these policy changes is recogniz-
ing that there is a problem with current policies. The bottom line of this
book is that the unprecedented fall in the employment rate of working-
aged people with disabilities in the 1990s was a direct effect of the
unintended consequences of public policies. To better integrate work-
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ing-aged people with disabilities into the workforce, increase their
employment, and reduce their dependence on SSDI and SSI will
require changes in these policies that make providing jobs less costly
for employers and the relative gains from work over disability income
supports greater for those with disabilities.
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1. Kaye provides data on both the prevalence of disability and the prevalence of
inability to work at all owing to just one of the individual conditions on the check-
list: back problems (Figure 6.11). For that condition, inability to work increases
from 10.3 percent of the former in 1988 to 11.4 percent in 2000, a 10.6 percent
increase. This increase is not evident in the figure, which plots the two series sep-
arately, rather than plotting the ratio. It is apparent from the full series for the ratio
that this change represents a trend, rather than just sampling error.
2. The relative change is missed when looking at Figure 6.15 because of the scale:
Kaye shows two rates that are both very small and appear to move in parallel, but
in fact they do not. Further, Figure 6.15 suggests that the two predicted series fit
the actual series very well. They do when considered independently, but there is
evidence of serial correlation in the prediction errors and an apparent negative
relationship between the errors for the two models. In the early years, the errors
for inability to work tend to be positive, while the errors for disability tend to be
negative, and in the latter years the opposite is true.
3. The concern we have is that Kaye assumes a constant relationship between body
mass index and work limitations. We think this relationship might have shifted
because sources of growth in obesity are likely different from sources of cross-
section variation in obesity. For instance, if reduced smoking has contributed to
growth in obesity, the prevalence of inability to work among those with a BMI in
the obese range might have declined.
4. One possible answer to the last question is that the application process takes
months, and even years. During this period, there was a large surge in applicants,
as reported by Goodman and Waidmann (Chapter 10). Therefore, even after
excluding beneficiaries, the Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) sample likely includes
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a large number of people who reported work limitations and were in the SSDI
application process.
5. Social Security Bulletin: 2001 Annual Statistical Supplement, Washington, DC:
Social Security Administration. In fiscal year 2000, the SSA spent $55 billion for
SSDI and $26 billion for SSI. In fiscal year 1998, the Medicare program paid pro-
viders $24 billion for services provided to SSDI beneficiaries, and the federal-
state Medicaid program paid $60 billion for services provided to working-aged
SSI recipients.
6. U.S. Department of Education, Budget History Table. Available at: <http://
www.ed.gov/offices/OUS/BudgetHistory/index.html>.
7. Intriguingly, evidence from a survey of private and government employers shows
that lack of training and lack of related experience are the main barriers to
employment and advancement of people with disabilities, not accommodation
costs (Bruyère 2000).
8. See Song (2002) for evidence on the positive impact of this change on the earn-
ings of persons aged 65–69.
9. See, for instance, Moffitt (2002) and Hotz and Scholz (forthcoming).
10. TW&WIIA includes provisions for SSA to develop and test early intervention
strategies.
11. See Burkhauser and Wittenburg (1996) for a detailed discussion of the implicit
taxes that disability income recipients face on their earnings, and how an earned
income tax credit could offset those taxes.
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